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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-3668 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
STEPHANIE METZ, 
    Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 1:13-cr-00243) 
District Judge: Hon. Yvette Kane 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 16, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
 
(Filed: July 17, 2015) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Stephanie Metz contends that the District Court improperly delegated its judicial 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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authority to the probation officer when it imposed a special condition of supervised 
release that prohibited Metz from obtaining employment involving finances “without 
prior approval from the probation officer.”  App. 5.  Because the District Court delegated 
only the ability to grant “exceptions” to its absolute prohibition on such employment, the 
condition was not an impermissible delegation and we will affirm.   
I 
 Metz was charged with conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286, entered a guilty plea, and was sentenced to twelve months’ 
imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.  A condition of Metz’s supervised 
release provided: “Without prior approval from the probation officer, the defendant is 
prohibited from obtaining any employment in which she would have control over money, 
finances, or engage in financial transactions.”  App. 5.  Metz appeals.    
II1 
 A sentencing court may impose a special condition of supervised release requiring 
the defendant to “refrain . . . from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or 
profession bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense, 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review the 
District Court’s decision to impose a special condition of supervised release for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2011).  Because Metz failed 
to raise her objection to the special condition before the District Court, we review for 
plain error, considering whether: “(1) an error was committed; (2) the error was plain; (3) 
the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the error ‘seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  Id. at 82 n.9 (quoting 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993)).  
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or engage in such a specified occupation, business, or profession only to a stated degree 
or under stated circumstances.”  18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5).  In imposing such a special 
condition of supervised release, a district court may delegate certain functions to 
probation officers, who have “broad statutory authority to advise and supervise 
probationers, and ‘to perform any other duty that the court may designate.’”  United 
States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3603(10)).  
Because probation officers are “nonjudicial officer[s],” however, their power is subject to 
certain limitations, the “most important” of which “is that a probation officer may not 
decide the nature or extent of the punishment imposed upon a probationer.”  Id.  
 In United States v. Maurer, this Court considered whether a special condition of 
supervised release constituted an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the 
probation office.  639 F.3d 72, 82 (3d Cir. 2011).  The condition in Maurer prohibited the 
defendant from “obtaining employment or performing volunteer work which includes, as 
part of its job/work description, contact with minor children without the expressed 
approval of the U.S. Probation Office.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).  The Court concluded that the special condition was “in accord with the 
Probation Office’s ministerial role,” reasoning that “approv[ing] exceptions” to an 
absolute prohibition on certain activity is permissible because “the nature and extent of 
the punishment remains predetermined by the District Court.”  Id. at 85-86. 
 Here, the District Court imposed a similar absolute occupational restriction that 
prohibited Metz from obtaining employment involving finances and granted the 
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probation officer authority only to “determine exceptions” to this prohibition.  Id. at 86.  
Because “the nature and extent of [Metz’s] punishment remains predetermined by the 
District Court,” the condition is not an impermissible delegation of judicial authority.  Id.; 
Cf. United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 411 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding impermissible 
delegation where district court ordered defendant to “follow the directions of the U.S. 
Probation Office regarding any contact with children” because it “delegate[d] full 
discretion over [the defendant’s] contact with minors,” including whether he could have 
any contact at all).2  Thus, the District Court did not err in imposing an occupational 
restriction that allowed probation to grant exceptions. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                                 
2 Metz seeks to distinguish this Court’s precedent, arguing that the special 
condition in this case was imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5), which permits the 
District Court to prohibit certain employment altogether or to impose a partial restriction 
on such employment “only to a stated degree or under stated circumstances.”  According 
to Metz, the District Court imposed a partial restriction and was therefore required to 
“state[]” a standard to guide the probation officer’s discretion.  Id.  This arguments fails.  
First, the condition in Maurer was also an occupational restriction imposed pursuant to 
§ 3563(b)(5) and therefore is not distinguishable.  Second, the condition the District 
Court imposed is an absolute prohibition on employment involving finances, not a 
prohibition limiting such employment “only to a stated degree or under stated 
circumstances.”  Thus, this clause of § 3563(b)(5) does not apply. 
